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  1The integration of ideas in the economic analysis of agents’ behaviour is a recent issue : 
introduced by the old institutionalist economic tradition (Commons 1935), the analysis has 
been developped by Hayek (Hayek 1952), before being retaken in the new institutional 
economics framework (North 1988, Denzau and North 1994, Knight and North 1997, North 
2005). The role of agents’ mental perceptions in their strategic choices seems a promising 
area to enrich the analysis of behaviours that do not seem fully understandable through the 
reading of their economic interest only. This has shown particularly convincing when 
analysing actors’ participation strategy in political making processes (see Murphy and 
Shleifer (2004), Muller (2000, 2005)). The ideological component of strategic choices made 
by individual or collective agents involved in a political activity seem to be influenced by the 
institutional environment characteristics, and to determine actors’ political behaviour. 
Basically, the institutions defined as “the rules of the game of a society” (North 1990, p 3), 
determine the set of possible choices for the organizations, defined as “the players” (North 
1990, p4), which can generate a set of mental perceptions. The role of ideas in the agents’ 
choices in this context has also been recently emphasized (Denzau and North 1994, Knight 
and North 1997, North 2005, Grindle, 2001). When actors face an institutional change in 
particular, the process of adaptation can be ruled by ideological factors including mental 
perceptions inherited from the past, and that can last after an institutional change, and 
determine actors’ capacity to adapt to this change. A key component of this adaptation that 
can be directly observed is the organisations political action that can resist, adapt, or take part 
to the institutional change. Institutions are indeed “subject to change under the organizations 
actions” (North 1993, p254). The purpose of this article is to investigate further this idea that 
the institutional change depends on organizations mental perceptions (North 1990, 1995, 
2005). Can we empirically show that actors’ mental perceptions play a role in organizational 
strategic choices? To address this question, we carry out a case study analysing the 
  2agricultural organizations taking part to the political making process in Costa Rica, and we 
relate political behaviours of organisations to the way they perceive themselves in the political 
process.  
The essential difficulty of the empirical demonstration that ideas influence strategic 
behaviours is to distinguish two kinds of differences in ideas: (i) ideas that arise from 
objective economic interests, and that are not necessary to account for the behaviours. These 
ideas can simply be seen as the actors’ consciousness of their economic interest, which differ 
from one actor to another; (ii) ideas that do not seem to fit perfectly to actors’ economic 
interest and that are necessary to explain paradoxical behaviours. These “paradoxical 
behaviours” do not necessarily mean that these actors have a non economic rationality, more 
likely do they account for the dynamic of ideas evolution, that can have a different path from 
the dynamic of economic interest, and still determine actors’ strategies.  
To that purpose we analyse four farm sectors in Costa Rica (milk, bean, coffee and pineapple 
sectors) that have evolved in different institutional environments and that are all four 
submitted to an institutional change, which can be roughly defined as the liberalization 
process. In the milk, pineapple and coffee sectors, the purchase of economic interest seems to 
explain the organizations political behaviour (that is to say that mental representations do not 
seem necessary to interpret their behaviour); whereas in the bean sector, producers’ 
organizations political behaviour cannot be explained in an accurate manner without invoking 
their mental representations. We find that the key difference between these sectors is related 
to different historical trajectories, which have determined different types of mental 
perceptions, assessed by a textual statistical analysis. In average, mental perceptions in the 
bean sector do not put farmers in a favourable position to take active part to the change, on the 
contrary to the milk, pineapple, and coffee sectors.  
 
  3The role of ideas as a determinant of political behaviours in the literature 
Traditionally, cognitive processes have been studied by psychologists and neurobiologists. 
The integration in cognition in the economic analysis has been emphasized recently
4 in the 
new institutional economics. In the 90s, North analysed the way mental models guide 
individual or collective choices (Denzau and North 1994) and underline their interaction with 
institutional change (North 1995); and the way cognition shapes institutions pointing 
particular (North 2005). His central point is that mental models guide actors choices, structure 
the institutional environment and at the end determine economic efficiency.  
Opening the rationality black box 
In the classical theory, choices are made according to substantive rationality: agents’ 
perceptions correspond to an objective reality, so that there is no space for subjective 
concerns. Classical prescriptions can predict situations of simple, frequent and motivated 
choices. However, in complex situations, classical prescriptions are insufficient to explain 
choices, which are made according to specified ideologies (Knight and North, 1997). The 
complexity can be related to an uncertainty on the choice gains, a low occurrence of the 
choice, or a lack of information (Denzau and North, 1994). In theses cases, the agent has to 
make his own interpretation of the elements he perceives to take a decision..  
Individual and shared mental models 
North follows Hayek idea of rational decisions as a product of social and cultural belief 
systems, and evoques the «  embeddedness of mental models in a social and institutional 
context » (North, 2005, p 33). The individual mental models are strongly affected by social 
interactions: Knight and North define cognition as «  an interacting process involving the 
internal dynamics of the individual mind and cultural resources found in the social context » 
                                                 
4 During the 1930s, we found the concept of “thinking habits” in the old institutional economics (Commons 
1935); in the 1980s, the French tradition of conventions economics developed the cognition concept (Bessy 
2002), and in the 90s, North made important assertions on the way cognition determines institutions (North 
1988, Denzau and North 1994, North 1995, Knight and North 1997, North 2005). 
  4(Knight and North, 1997). In a society, there is some established and recognized shared 
mental models, explaining a certain “convergence of individual mental models” (Denzau and 
North, 1994), and constituting a path-dependent element of the economic change (North 2005, 
p 52).   
Understanding the relations between mental models and institutions 
For Knight and North, shared mental models guide choices made by organizations in 
uncertainty situation, and thus constraint the societies political and economical evolutions 
(Knight et North, 1997). The same basic idea was present in the Denzau and North paper, 
which defined institutions as “external mechanisms that the individuals create to structure 
their environment on the basis of shared mental models” (Denzau and North, 1994). North 
develops that assertion in 2005, considering the institutions as “the external manifestation of 
belief systems” (North 2005, p 49). In feedback, the mental models are subject to change in a 
permanent dynamic process of interactions with the institutional environment.  
At the end: the economic efficiency 
Economic efficiency has always been the final point in North’s assertions on the way ideas 
affect strategic choices and institutional structures (Knight and North 1997, North 2005). In a 
static way, taking into account ideas helps to explain strategic choices made by economic 
agents. In a dynamic way, taking into account the evolution of ideas (by a learning process) 
helps to understand economic changes.  
The gap: a lack of empirical studies  
If there is a consensus in the new institutional economics on the need to include ideological 
factors further in the analysis, there is no explicit description of the way theses factors 
determine behaviours. Most authors emphasize on the need to carry on empirical research to 
reinforce the theory. North’s insistence on the relations between ideas, organizations and 
institutions constitutes a research area that has to be explored in an empirical way (Alston 
  51996), in order to better understand the mechanisms under action (North 1997, Shirley 2004).  
The main contribution of this communication is precisely to present a case study that 
describes how mental representations influence strategic choice made by collective actors in 
the case of agricultural organizations participation in the political making process during the 
liberalisation scheme.  
 
A case study methodology  
To underline the way ideas affect strategic choices made by organizations, we rely on four 
case studies. Each of these case studies corresponds to an agricultural sector in Costa Rica, 
and has been chosen in function of its dynamics and its market destination. Regarding the 
liberalization process, theses sectors had to face different stakes:  
-  Two sectors are oriented to the domestic market (milk and bean), and in the liberalized 
context, their protection action’s levers are import tariff and quality norms.  
-  Two others are exports sectors (pineapple and coffee), and their protection action’s 
levers are basically regulation and export enhancing systems.  
Organizations characteristics 
Organizations characteristics are roughly described by the following concepts:  
-  Their political experience. Experienced organizations will have great ability to obtain 
gains from their political action: that idea is related with learning and pathdependence 
concepts (North 1990, 2005).  
-  Their resources (technical abilities, human support, political network insertion, 
financial). The more an organization mobilizes resources, the more it will be able to 
satisfy its objectives.  
-  Their perception of their environment, and their own situation in that environment, 
more specifically the way they perceive and interpret the political making process. 
  6Agents’ mental perceptions are derived from a series of interviews carried out in Costa Rica, 
with agricultural producers, organizations leaders, civil servants and firm’s representatives. 
The interviews have been used for two goals: (i) a qualitative understanding of actors’ 
trajectories, their participation in the political making process and the way they perceive their 
role in the process; (ii) a statistical textual analysis with a specific lexicometric software 
(Alceste
5) that helps relating the language used by actors and their mental perceptions. The 
statistical textual analysis, developped in the 80s, relies on a starting hypotesis that the words 
emploied refer to subjacent mental representations that can be clarified (Reinert 1986, p 472). 
The basic objective is a quantitative definition of lexical specificity (Tournier, 1980) that 
leads to the production of qualitative structural information.  There are many possible 
methods (see Jenny 1997), we chose to use the lexicometric one because of its decisive 
contribution as regards to software instrumentalization and of its broad application to social 
sciences (Brugidou 2000). The Alceste software permited us to study actors speeches through 
the frequency of the words used but also through the formal structure of their co-events.  
Interviews were carried out in an open way so that each actor could feel free to talk about his 
situation with his own vocabulary, answering the following question: “what do you think 
about the political making process in your sector?” 
Organisations behaviours 
Organisations behaviours are analysed through the precise analysis of their participation in the 
policy making process. This includes the description of organisations’ relations with policy 
makers, and the analysis of the results of their action in terms of public support they get 
during the liberalisation process. The efficiency of their action is adequacy of this 
participation to policy making. In particular the negotiation of import tariff is used as the 
primary indicator of the result of their participation, in line with basic results of political 
                                                 
5 From french, meaning “Analysis of Co-occurring Lexemes in Simple Utterances of a Written Text” 
  7economy (see for instance Rodrik, 1996) . Thus, we analyse more in detail the way milk and 
bean sectors negotiated in 1994 their import tariff.   
Results 
Efficiency of the participation in the political making process (PMP) 
Each one of he four sectors studied had special characteristics concerning the PMP:  here we 
choose to present very briefly some of these characteristics in the Table 1, like the resources 
mobilized by political organizations, the actions carried out, and the results obtained from 
theses actions.  
Table 1 : Participation of professional organizations to the political making process
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  8A quick reading of this table confirms the intuitive features that “traditional” determinants of 
organisation political action (resources endowment, experience, and the existence of political 
space to negotiate) are favourable factors for organisations to obtain better political results. 
For instance, we can compare the bean and milk sectors, as far as the imports policy is 
concerned: in 1994, when facing WTO conditions, the bean sector failed to implement an 
import tariff that could protect the domestic production (1%), while the milk sector obtained a 
117% import tariff. The domestic regulation significantly shows a low efficiency of the bean 
political participation to the change of economic and institutional change as compared with 
the milk sector. If we look at the political spaces used by the bean sector, we see that bean 
actors try to negotiate with Agriculture Ministry when strategic decisions are taken in the 
ministry of foreign trade and the ministry of economics. That is to say that, contrary to the 
milk sector, bean sector is not “acting where the constraint is exerted”, that could be seen as 
paradoxical, and can certainly be qualified as an inefficient allocation of its resources. It is not 
a lack of economic interest to take part to the change, but more likely a lack of adaptability to 
the change. So why don’t bean producers implement the adequate political actions in a 
liberalised environment as the milk sector to get the same negotiation power with the policy 
makers? To address this question we formulate the following hypothesis: the former 
institutional environment (before liberalisation) had determined mental perceptions that were 
corresponding to economic interests during that period (given this existing institutional 
environment). When an institutional change occurred, these mental perceptions have 
remained for a while, and have determined behaviours that could seem “obsolete” in the new 
environment, and thus lead to inefficient behaviours. In the milk sector, the policies prevailing 
before the liberalisation included incentives for farmers to take part actively to the political 
process, and indirectly, have taught organisations to adapt to change.  
 
  9Characterisation of mental perception regarding the political making process in each sector 
During the interviews, organization’s leaders were invited to talk freely about the way their 
specific sector was defending politically its interests. The textual analysis, made on the basis 
of theses responses defined four lexical classes, presented below. Each class corresponds to a 
specific “lexical world”, defined on the basis of specific “representative forms” linked in a 
specific way. A factorial analysis gives us a representation of theses classes and identifies the 
way the different agricultural sectors correspond –or not- to theses classes (figure 1). It results 
that each sector is more particularly represented by a different class: that is to say that the 
lexical classes representing mental perceptions of the political making process are 
significantly different for each sector. In the following table 2, the figures into brackets 
correspond to the asociated chi-square.  
Table 2: Representative forms and sectors variables corresponding to the lexical classes  
Classes and corresponding sectors variables Representative forms 
Class 1 (red one) 
          Pineapple (9),           Milk (3) 
Interest (76), Advantages (34), To defend (33), 
Defense (32), To organize (28), ... 
Class 2 (green one) 
          Milk (10) 
Relation (50), Affiliated (30), Organization (16), 
To represent (11), ... 
Class 3 (blue one) 
          Coffee (70) 
Institute (31), Policies (25), Law (24), To regulate/ 
regulation (20), ... 
Class 4 (yellow one) 
          Bean (41) 
Problem (27), Agriculture (19), Ministry (17), 
Conflict (11), Support (11), ... 
A signed chi-square test shows that classes 1 and 2 are relatively close, while the class 4 is 
distant from the three others. This means that bean actors’ mental perceptions are quite 
different from those of others actors. If we consider the representative forms in each class, we 
saw that in class 4 there are a lot of “passive words», while the classes 1, 2 and 3 show more 
  10“active words”: it seems that in the bean sector, mental models traduce a sort of passivity in 
the relations with policy makers.  










The bean example shows that there is a robust correspondence between the way the actors are 
participating to the political making process and the way they are perceiving and interpreting 
this process. For bean producers, mental perception can determine behaviour, which seems in 
contradiction with the efficient behaviour of participation to the political process. The 
dynamics of institutional change, when it is exogenous, can be much faster than the dynamic 
of ideas, leading to situations of inefficiency. 
  11Mental perceptions and change 
Depending on the institutional environments, a same mental model can lead to efficient or 
inefficient behaviours  
We saw that in a liberalized context, mental models in the bean sector could appear as 
“obsolete”, when they seem adequate in the milk sector. But if we look the context before 
liberalization, it gives quite a different picture. Indeed, in the bean sector, the institutional 
environment was basically made of public support to farmers under the form of production 
subsidies ruled by the ministry of agriculture: farmers were in position of “receiving” a stable 
public support without having to negotiate it. The point is that a specific mental model that 
appears as inadequate in a situation could have been perfectly adequate and have led to 
efficient behaviours in a past situation.  
Mental models are inherited from past institutional environments 
The previous point leads us to the statement that mainly mental models are inherited from the 
past. Thus, we have to reinterpret the bean and milk situation regarding their respective 
histories. The bean sector used to receive important public supports without really 
participating to the definition of theses public supports, which could better explain their 
“inappropriate” present attitude. In the milk sector, there were important public regulations 
too but the key difference is that professional organisations used to negotiate the regulations 
content, and were encouraged – or forced – to do so. This past of strong and frequent 
interactions between the sector and the government explains that mental models refers to very 
active forms of acting and leads to efficient political results.   
Confronted to new institutional environments, mental models change gradually  
Anyway, mental models are submitted to gradual change with experience accumulation. Let’s 
take the example once again of the bean sector. We analysed the 1994 situation where their 
behaviour appeared inefficient in regard of their economic interests. But if we take a look at 
  12the 2004 situation, we observe that –taking into account the same concepts- their behaviour is 
much more efficient: professional organizations are more active, and do not refer anymore to 
Agriculture Ministry as the only relevant interlocutor. That means that bean organizations 
have shifted in ten years from a passive attitude towards policies to a more active and better 
targeted one (better insertion in political networks, better technical endowment….) that enable 
them to defend in a more accurate way the domestic production.  
 
Conclusion  
The way political actors represent themselves in the political making process explains the way 
they act in that process to a large extent, and at the end the different political results observed. 
The empirical implication is that some sectors managed to put into place political activity that 
ensures their survival in a liberalized environment, while others are facing the liberalization 
situation in a more passive way. Our contribution is to confirm empirically that mental models 
developed themselves in specific institutional environments (and thus correspond to theses 
environments), but also that when an exogenous change occurs in those environments, the 
former mental models could persist and lead to inefficient behaviours. Furthermore, we 
demonstrate that if actors’ mental models are inherent to the past, they could also evolve 
when confronted to a new institutional environment (towards a model that fits this specific 
environment). Nevertheless, this evolution process is sometimes slow and gradual, depending 
on the adaptability that they have got or not in the past. 
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